I got the following versions: Framework: 5.0.86-dev Console: 5.0.86-dev
The os that metasploit is installed are windows 10.
I get a meterpreter session with an android device (genymotion virtual machine) device and desktop are on the same network and also device has enabled gps with pre-defined lat & long and when I enter the following command in meterpreter:
run post/multi/gather/wlan_geolocate APIKEY=my google map API key (clean, without quotes or anything else) GEOLOCATE=true
I get the result in the photo with the error as I describe in the title, does anyone know if its a version SSL problem or something? how and where to search to fix this problem?
I keep reading that in an X.509 certificate chain of trust that the "Issuer Name" in a certificate that has been signed by the Issuer must "match" the "Subject Name" of the Issuer’s certificate. Exactly how is this match determined? Do all of the RDNs (Relative Distinguished Names) have to match between both the Subject Name and Issuer Name or is the match determined solely by the RDNs that are present in the Issuer certificate’s Subject Name, or is some other match algorithm at work?
We have a website hosted behind WAF(FortiWeb) and Firewall (FortiGate). The WAF already has the server valid SSL Certificate from public CA. Do we need to install SSL certificate on Firewall also for inbound traffic to make it more secure ? Will Unscanned https traffic reach the firewall first compromise the network ?
Most tutorials on the net only mention sending the digital signature attached to the document, but without the digital signature certificate, it’ll be impossible for receivers to verify the signature. I’m assuming that the digital certificate is somehow sent alongside the signature but I can’t seem to find any source mentioning that.
I have spent the last few days setting up a freeradius server with eap-tls as the only authentication method. I have used this old tutorial for setting up my own CA and generating the certificates and adjusted the older parameters to match the current ones.
So far I managed to authenticate my iPhone 6 running iOS 11.1.2 as a test device, for that I have:
- Installed the root CA’s(the one I created) certificate on my iPhone
- Installed a test identity profile on my iPhone with the name "Test" and test passphrase, which I converted to a .p12 file
Now when I connect to the network with the freeradius server running in debug mode, I can select EAP-TLS as the auth type and tell it to use the identity certificate. It then prompts me to trust the server’s certificate and I get a successful connection.
I have 2 questions:
- Why do I need to trust the server’s certificate if I have the root CA’s certificate installed? As far as I understood the way the authentication works is as follows:
The server and client each send their respective certificate for the other party to authenticate with the root CA’s certificate. After both are completed there is an optional challenge for the client to complete? (I’m not sure about this) and the client is authenticated
The server doesn’t need to be told to explicitly trust the client certificate but the client needs to explicitly trust the server’s even though they are both issued and signed by the same root CA and both parties have the certificate needed to be able to verify it
AFAIK the whole point of certificate-based authentication is to prevent MiTM attacks that other methods are vulnerable against. If the user initially connects to a spoofed access-point and accepts that certificate it will refuse the correct RADIUS server and leak the client certificate to the wrong server, this would be avoided if the client can verify the server certificate on its own without user intervention
- There is a username option when selecting the network on the iPhone, which does get matched against a backend SQL database by the freeradius server regardless of that username existing the server accepts the authentication. This page notes that the username is used in inner and outer authentication but to me, that doesn’t seem to make sense as there is no inner and outer identity in EAP-TLS. I assume there is a way to tell the radius server to only accept requests that match a username in the database but if it is not configured that way by default what is the point? Doesn’t the certificate already uniquely identify the device/user and what is the point of the username field if anything can be entered?
I would appreciate an explanation to these concepts, I’m relatively new to certificate-based authentication and RADIUS in general so I’m still learning the basics.
The goal of this endeavor is to deploy the server in an eduroam-like environment where users can generate certificates for their devices on some website, download the two needed certificates and get access without having to trust another.
I should also note that I have complete access and control over the server and my CA so I can modify anything as needed, so no quirky workarounds here.
I am surprised that I couldn’t find one concrete example of how to do root certificate rotation. For example:
- Root CA has 2 years validity period
- Intermediate CA has 9 months validity period
- leaf certificate has a 3 months validity period
The renwal/replace time are:
- Root CA is going to be replaced every 1 year
- Intermediate CA is going to be replaced every 6 months
- leaf certificate is going to be renewed every 2 months
- 1 month buffer for service to renew its certificate before the certificate expires.
- 3 months buffer for intermediate CA to sign new service certificate. By the time the old intermediate CA expire, all the old issued certificates are expired as well.
- 1 year buffer to distribute the new root certificates to client. We want to give enough time for clients to pull the new root certificate before the old one expires.
- We have root 1 and root 2 overlapped for 1 year, when should we start signing new CSR using root 2 certificate?
If the one year overlapped time is just for cert distribution, by the time root 1 expired, all clients should already have root 2 trusted. However, by the time root 1 expires, we haven’t signed any new server certificates with root 2. It means when the time root 1 expires, all the services will be down. I guess we will need to ensure all services are using cert from root 2 before we can retire root 1? and we also have to ensure all clients have root 2 key before issuing server certificates using root 2? I think that makes sense but in terms of timeline, how should we managed that? In the 1 year overlapped time, maybe we can do 6 months distribution time, and 6 months signing time. so by the time root 1 retire, everything will be running on root 2 already?
And if we are using private CA, (lets say AWS private CA) , do we need to implement a service to ensure things above will happen?
Given that we own all the clients and servers.
I’ve coded my app to use https, but if a https transaction fails for any reason, I assume it’s because the server isn’t configured for https, and thereafter start all transactions with http. Seems like that’s a vulnerability. Likewise, a script kiddie using a proxy to intercept the traffic on his client hardware would be able to make all https transactions fail.
I’m told that if someone tries to MITM your app’s HTTPS request then the request should fail (invalid certificate) and your app should fail with an error, not fallback to HTTP. In a world where SSL is reliably available, sure, but maintaining valid SSL certs is a task in itself. For example, letsencrypt recently revoked some of their certificates and forced renewal of same because of some security problem. Aside from revocations, certs are short term and have to be renewed, and the renewal process involves a lot of stitchware, and can fail. If SSL goes down, I don’t want my site to go dark.
What is the best guidance for either:
More reliably maintaining certificates (such that if they do fail, the resulting downtime falls within the "five nines" SLA unavailability window) without it being such a manual headache, or
Allowing the site to continue to work if SSL has failed? Is it easy to allow most activity to proceed using http, but allow known-critical transactions to require https.
Note that no browsers are involved in the scenarios that concern me.
I have a server and I want my iPhone to connect to it securely. However, I cannot just install the self-signed server certificate on my iPhone. When I install the profile (that’s what they call the certificate), it says "Not verified".
Normally, you would go to CA Trust settings and enable full trust for the certificate. BUT I deliberately made the certificate with
critical,CA:false constraint. That’s the reason it does not show in the CA Trust settings.
Why did I do it — I just need to install the single certificate and I don’t want to totally compromise my iPhone security, if my CA credentials got stolen.
Do this have a solution? iOS probably requires a CA to trust a certificate, but I don’t want a possibility to create certificates at all (beside the one), or at least for another domains.
One potential "solution" might be to create the CA, sign the server certificate and then delete the CA key, as it would not be needed and would live for a shorter time (lower chance to get stolen).
However, people except me wouldn’t be stoked to install it. (I don’t want to buy a certificate as its a home project and I don’t even have a domain name, just the IP address.)
The certificate complies with apple’s current requirements for server certificates. (https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210176)
Is there a simple C library or function to programmatically generate a self-signed certificate in C on Ubuntu? Of course, one can execute a simple
system("....") call to execute a CLI. I am looking for a native, small, stand-alone library just for this purpose with possibly added functionality but not with the full-weight of TLS implementations such as openssl, boringssl, mbedTls, etc.
Want to set up authentication in a python websocket server which builds up its ssl context like:
ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER) ctx.load_cert_chain('certificates/server_cert.pem', 'certificates/server_key.pem') ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED ctx.load_verify_locations('certificates/bob_cert.pem')
Following the example in here (only for the creation of certificates) I created three keypairs and certificates, one for the websocket server and two client certs. As stated in the example I signed alice’s cert with the server cert and bob’s cert is self-signed.
If I now connect via bob’s cert and set
verify_locations in the server as above, bob magically gets into the server (which doesn’t do more then echo back what you sent). But if I connect via alice’s cert (signed by server cert) I do not get accepted – getting a
ConnectionResetError, the parameter
verify_locations in the above code is then of course set to accept alice_cert.pem. For completion, below you find the code for ssl context creation of the client side (here for bob):
ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT) ctx.check_hostname = True ctx.load_verify_locations('certificates/server_cert.pem') ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED ctx.load_cert_chain('certificates/bob_cert.pem', 'certificates/bob_key.pem')
What am I doing wrong or where did I misunderstand the tutorial I followed (link above), how can the unrelated (to the server cert) self-signed certificate used by bob (ISSUER CN=bob, SUBJ CN=bob) get access whereas alice cert which is signed by the server cert (ISSUER CN=localhost, SUBJ CN=alice) does get rejected?