Can we share USB flash drives on a computer network?
Example : USB flash drives connected to a local Windows/Mac/Linux os machine is part of the computer network. The contents of the USB flash drives to be shared with other computers.
Can this be implemented?
SEDs use a password to generate KEK by a KDF algorithm. The KEK is then used to encrypt the MEK (where MEK is internally generated in the drive). But TCG-Opal drives have 9 locking-ranges and each of these ranges use its own MEK (say MEK1 – MEK9). There are also 4 Admins and 8 Users, each has its own password (PIN). Which of these passwords are used to generate the KEK, or are there multiple KEKs ? The TCG core spec and the Opal SSC spec don’t detail the relation of a password to the MEK of any locking-range.
I’m going to sell a computer hard drive on the Internet, it’s a 500GB SATA hard drive, I really used it 3 or 2 years ago, I never used it again, I used about 20 or 40% of the space.
I have read about various tools and used Hardwipe, first I deleted the volume and recreated it, then with the program (option to clean free space) I used the GOST R 50739-95 method, when it finished then I did it again with the random method (both It took about 6 hours, in total I spent 2 days on this task, and I had several interruptions so I had to disconnect and continue the overwrite).
I have read an article on the internet (I shouldn’t believe everything I read on the internet, but that’s why I am asking this question), where it mentions that overwriting these random bytes is not enough and even if I used the DoD 5220.22-M method the data could To be recoverable, it mentions that a good method is degaussing (but this is really crazy, that is, a disk that used so little space), is this information really true? Should I use a Gutmann method?
I am unable to get agent jobs to output to a network path. I have pushed the IT guy to set up a domain authenticated user that logs in when the agent starts. That login does have access to the domain and is able to see the network drives. If I set the location of the output file to be the local c: then this works without issue. However if I set the drive to be a network location I get the following message;
[SQLSTATE 01000] (Message 0)Unable to open Step output file. The step succeeded.
Any help would be very much appreciated
Does Pre-boot encryption works on all drives or just the C drive?
where does the recoverykey store
I have three SATA hard drives that I use every day. Suppose I disable the corresponding SATA ports of these hard drives through my BIOS, add another storage device to my PC, install another instance of Windows 10 and run unsafe executables on it – would my three SATA hard drives be completely isolated and safe?
As I understand it, unmounted partitions are at risk, but not partitions that I exclude by disabling the corresponding SATA ports.
Is this correct?
I would like to protect my flash drives to being infected when I put it in another computers or devices. After some research, I found that I will not be able to reach this level of protection by using only software solutions (correct me if I’m wrong).
However, I don’t have a flash drive with hardware protection and my only way to get one is importing (it will not be cheap). I also found that SD card’s switches against writing is not in a hardware-level, so I kinda have to trust that a potentially infected computer will respect it, which is not a good idea.
So, my question is: is there a trustful way (using USB) to put my files into another computer without my USB stick (flash drive or SD card) being infected?
Why are currently trying to enhance the security posture of our company, and this means changing how some IT personnel work.
Precisely, our IT helpdesk now have 2 separate accounts: 1 for normal day to day usage (mails, internet, etc…), and 1 for administrative tasks. The later is a privileged account having several rights on the AD and some servers.
The way they work is not very secure when it comes to supporting the users: they use their privileged account to login to the user’s workstation and perform tasks where admin rights are needed.
But my question is more accurately related to network drives being mapped in their privileged account’s profile. They insisted on using the same logon script as with their standard account.
Do you have any recommendations, references to guidelines and/or best practices in such a case ? I’d like to present them some resources to convince them it’s not secure to have network drives mapped in this profile.
I tried to explain to them that if they log in a ‘contaminated’ workstation, their privileges might spread the infection to the network… But they did not understand and argued they need to access some files on the network while assisting the users. They don’t want to waste time typing UNC path, etc…
I am trying to understand what generic risks are there in using my thumb drive to transfer files to some untrusted machine and plugging it back to my Windows device. Specifically I am interested in generic threats when I plug my USB Drive to external machine is compromised (like public image printing shop).
As far as I understand 2 main risks are:
A) Malicious files are copied to my pen drive from a compromised system and than
- I open them manually on a personal computer.
- Viruses are run automatically on usb drive plug in. (obsolete unless autorun is enabled manually on target machine)
- Malware is executed without user interaction and with autorun disabled. Such example would be something like buffer overflow in windows image thumbnail generator (CVE: 2010-3970). As far as I understand no user interaction will be needed and machine can be infected on it`s own (besides inserting USB drive, and browsing the folder of course).
B) Automated BadUSB firmware reprogramming. With all the further consequences that BadUSB deliver. But generally this kind of attack is not present in form of generic attack as it would require to support huge amounts of different peripheral manufacturers with different devices.
So my questions are:
Are there any other generic (non-targeted) threats that are similarly widespread in the wild?
In respect to risk 3 – how common are such almost no user interaction vulnerabilities in the wild?
In our corp environment, we are being required to move our file shares to SharePoint Online. In order to maintain some semblance of ease of use for the general user population, we’re trying to continue to use mapped drives. Bizarrely, Microsoft discourages this (no reason given why). We’re still gonna try.
Our procedure, which always gets things working in the short term:
- Add our SP site (
https://XXXXX.sharepoint.com) to the Internet Properties Control Panel Trusted Sites list (using wildcards, e.g.
https://*.sharepoint.com does not work)
- Open Internet Explorer (must be IE, not any other browser), log out of our SSO corporate SP site, close IE, reopen IE, sign back in, close IE
Map the SP Document Library to a drive letter, e.g.
net use T: https://XXXXX.sharepoint.com/sites/myteamfileshare.group /PERSISTENT:YES
This works “for a while.” (It even survives logouts/reboots.) After some time period (around a week?), when a user logs back in, the drive has a red X over the drive icon in Windows explorer, and if the user tries to access that drive in Windows Explorer, they get this error dialog:
This error can be resolved if the user performs step #2 above (opening IE, logging out, closing IE, etc.), but that is an unacceptable workaround.
It unfortunately looks like this problem has been around for quite some time, in some form or another (cf. The network drives mapped to Sharepoint Documents Library cannot reconnect after login in Portal O365 and intermittent Error when Using File Explorer to access Sharepoint content)
Any methods to get a consistently mapped drive that doesn’t disconnect are very appreciated!