Can we say that CA produces the hash of TBSCertificate and then encrypt it instead of signing it? [duplicate]

CA signs the TBSCertificate, this is a pretty known fact.

Signing m means producing the hash value of m then encrypting m. For example: https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_algorithm#Signing_messages

Does this apply to signing certificates?

Here the answerer says:

The most important is that both your encrypt boxes are wrong, they should say sign.

How to verify PGP signature with signing key using Enigmail in Thunderbird [migrated]

I received an email like this above:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1  Because anyone can claim to be me. There's no validation of the user name or email address when someone posts a comment. While I do try to remove imposters, some may slip through. By signing my comments using this technique, anyone can independently verify that I was the author of the message by validating the signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (MingW32)  iD8DBQFFxqRFCMEe9B/8oqERAqA2AJ91Tx4RziVzY4eR4Ms4MFsKAMqOoQCgg7y6 e5AJIRuLUIUikjNWQIW63QE= =aAhr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 

And another email with the public key. How can I verify if the signature is valid using the Enigmail in Thunderbird?

Should I be concerned about websites emailing me my plaintext password after signing up? [duplicate]

In multiple instances lately, I have received the plaintext passwords I entered(not given to me) emailed to me after signing up. The sites in question have been legitimate small businesses, so I suspected it was a default setting. Is this something I as a user should be worried about? In other words, are they not only storing my password in plaintext but sharing it with my mail provider? Here is a link to one example screenshot, too large to fit in the post.

Conceptual question regarding signing with Yubikey/Solokey/Nitrokey using GnuPG

The named hardware dongles (or at least several models of them) allow me to store PGP secret keys key.

Suppose I am using such a secret key to sign data (doesn’t matter what). As I understand the operation happens on the hardware itself and the PGP secret key doesn’t leave the device.

Now suppose I am signing several GiB of data, does that mean all that data gets squeezed through the hardware and therefore the hardware dongle becomes a bottleneck, or is the signature practically the same as signing a hash of the data – where the hash gets computed on my host machine?

To summarize:

  • When signing large amounts of data, will that data go through the hardware dongle in some way or will its hash be computed and the signature simply signifies the validity of the hash?
  • Does the involvement of gpg-agent change anything? I.e. suppose I am signing content on host2 connected from host1 which has the hardware dongle with the PGP secret key plugged in.
  • Suppose I am encrypting data against some public key and subsequently signing it. Does this change anything or create a bottleneck?

control digital signing

Here is the use case:

  1. Router vendor to support 3rd party app hosting on their Routers with apps digitally signed by Router vendor only.
  2. Router to support skipping signature verification for App developers/vendors during Dev phase.
  3. Router to enforce signature verification in production mode.
  4. Router vendor to build this solution on a production router image so that they don’t need to provide separate Dev/Test router image to app vendors during Dev phase.

What is the secure way to support this on embedded systems like Routers without having to create 2 separate sets of images for Dev and Production from the router vendor?

Is it possible to craft a certificate signing chain that thwarts MITM corporate VPNs?

Some companies install corporate VPNs which also come with a root certificate installed on all employees’ machines. This allows for encrypted traffic to be decrypted by technology installed on the VPN. Some companies even have to do this to meet certain auditing and compliance requirements.

Is it possible for a website to set up a certificate signing chain in a way that if root cert that signed it is replaced by the corporate VPNs root cert, it would either fail to load the website, or prevent it from being overwritten by the root cert entirely in the first place?

Or, if there’s a root cert installed on a machine, is it impossible to prevent TLS intercepting by a MITM party?

JWS: signing HTTP headers

Looking over the spec for JSON Web Signature / JWS https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515, I realise that it doesn’t seem to specify a method for signing HTTP headers.

Is there some way to use JWS to verify that HTTP headers were set by the same party that signed the JWS payload? [Or perhaps, suggest an alternative mechanism]

Certificates for authentication and signing

Cross posting from SO to here for better reach https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62137112/certificates-for-authentication-and-signing

I have a client server scenario.

I have both thick client and a thin client (browser) which communicates with my server.

My thick client uses X-509 system certificate for client certificate authentication scenario and communicates with the server

Also this certificate is used for used to generate signed URL (with expiration time) for my thin client to communicate with my server which is used for integrity and authorization purpose. I also have a token based approach for authentication purpose in this case.

Now i want to complete move my authentication mechanism to OAuth based flow using client credentials or auth code based.

I understand that authentication and authorization can be moved to OAuth based communication. But how do i move my signing (digital signature) based use case to OAuth from certificate based ?

I don’t think there is any other way than to use certificate based PKI mechanism for digital signing. Can the private and public keys be distributed other than the certificates ?

Best Regards,

Saurav